Abstract-In this paper, we design a system for mutually distrustful entities to perform privacy preserving joins, leveraging the power of a memory-limited secure coprocessor. Under this setting, we critique a questionable assumption in a previous privacy definition [1] that leads to unnecessary information leakage. We then remove the assumption and propose a new definition. Based on this definition, we propose three correct and provable secure algorithms to compute general joins of arbitrary predicates, by utilizing available cryptographic tools in a nontrivial way. We discuss different memory requirements of our proposed algorithms, and explore how to trade little privacy with significant performance improvement. In [2], we evaluate the performance of our algorithms by numerical examples. We also show the performance superiority of our approach over secure multi-party computation in [2] .
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of how entities compute arbitrary join functions over their data in a privacy preserving way such that no party learns more than what can be deduced from its input and output alone. Two motivating applications of privacy preserving joins in airport security and national healthcare were presented in [1] .
One straight forward solution to perform privacy preserving join is to rely on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to whom all parties submit their inputs. This TTP then computes the desired function and distributes the results. However, finding such a TTP to be unanimously trusted by all parties is usually difficult due to the high level of trust on the TTP.
Another approach is along the lines of the secure multiparty computation problem where parties collectively perform a computation over their data [3] . This approach assumes a low level of trust among the parties, but its computation and communication complexities are prohibitively high.
In this paper, we provide an alternative solution that strikes a balance between the level of the required trust and performance, by presenting a system that functions as a TTP, with a secure coprocessor being the only trusted component.
A secure coprocessor is a programmable general purpose computing environment that withstands physical and logical attacks. One example of such commercially available devices is IBM 4764 cryptographic coprocessors [4] .
As pointed out by Agrawal et al. in [1] , developing secure applications on a secure coprocessor faces two main challenges. Firstly, the limited memory capacities of secure coprocessors preclude the trivial solution of performing a computation inside a secure coprocessor with ever growing .berkeley .edu database size inputs and outputs. Secondly, the access pattern between a secure coprocessor and its host machine may serve as a covert channel to convey useful information to an observer sitting at the host machine. Our contributions are as follows:
. We critique a previous privacy definition in [1] for algorithms designed for secure coprocessors and point out the provably secure algorithms proposed in [1] leak information unnecessarily. * We propose three provably correct and secure algorithms to compute general joins of arbitrary predicates and discuss trade-offs among the algorithms. In [2] , we compare the their performance to the best known result from secure multi-party computation, and show that our algorithms are orders of magnitude faster. Please refer to [2] for a complete review on the related work and complete details of our solutions and results.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION 1) System Overview: Our computation model consists of a service provider and multiple service requestors. A service provider is a host 'H to which the secure coprocessor IT is attached. Service requestors are data owners and recipients of join results. The data owners send their data to the service provider which computes the join and distributes the results to the intended recipients. We assume authenticated and secure communication channels between the service provider and individual service requestors [5] .
2) Threat Model: We distinguish two types of standard adversary models in this paper: honest-but-curious and malicious adversaries [3] . An honest-but-curious party follows the prescribed protocol properly, but may keep intermediate computation results, e.g. messages exchanged, and try to deduce additional information from them other than the protocol result. A malicious adversary may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. Such deviation can be detected in a systemic and effective way, as described in [1] and [2] . As such, we assume honest-but-curious adversaries in the rest of our analysis. The ultimate goal of a privacy preserving join algorithm is to reveal no information other than what can be inferred from the join result. We point out two problems in Definition 1 that cause algorithms satisfying the definition to leak more information than what we expect from this goal.
Firstly, the assumption of the number N permits join algorithms to leak the knowledge of N by definition. Such information leakage is not justified in [1] and might be critical. As shown in later sections, this assumption is also unnecessary.
Secondly, Definition 1 does not explicitly prescribe the join result, which allows algorithms to produce a superset of the real join result and leak information unnecessarily. We show in our technical report [2] that the provable safe algorithms in [1] under Definition 1 leak statistics of the number of joins per tuple in A. This knowledge would not be available to a recipient had it received only the real join tuples.
In terms of performance, The algorithms in [1] outputs a fixed amount of N Al join tuples regardless of the actual join result size. This is not ideal for most of the applications.
In this paper, we define privacy preserving joins with respect to honest-but-curious adversaries. We distinguish our definition from Definition 1 in three aspects: a) removal of the assumption of N, b) an explicit requirement of a join algorithm to compute exact join results with no additional padding, and c) extension to the multi-party scenario.
According to Definition 2, we say a join algorithm is privacy preserving if its access pattern is independent of the inputs. B. Oblivious Sort All our algorithms require removing the generated decoys in a privacy preserving way. An oblivious sorting algorithm sorts a list of encrypted elements such that no observer learns the relationship between the position of any element in the original list and the output list. To keep ,u elements (e.g. join results) in a list of length w, we apply oblivious sort on smaller portions of the list repeatedly to achieve high efficiency.
Firstly, we create a buffer of ,u + A elements, where A is the size of a swap area. We copy ,u + A elements from the source list to the buffer, and obliviously sort them to keep the selected elements in the top ,u positions in the buffer. Since at most ,u elements can be selected, the bottom A elements in the swap area can be overwritten. We copy another A elements from the source list, and overwrite the bottom A elements. We obliviously sort the buffer again to keep all the selected elements in the top positions.
This process is continued until all elements in the source list is processed. The top ,u elements in the buffer are then the desired elements to keep. The total number of comparisons in the whole process, denoted as C(,,/,) (A), is given by (1)
IV. PRIVACY PRESERVING JOINS
In this section, we present three join algorithms designed for a secure coprocessor 7, and discuss their communication cost and privacy preserving levels. Please refer to [2] In Algorithm A2, the write cycle is L tuples and the write efficiency is M. When M < S, IT spends a large number of write cycles to output all S join results, resulting in a high read cost. One way to improve the efficiency is to shorten the write cycle.
We assume that IT knows L and S. In addition, IT is able to randomly read every iTuple once and only once. This can be done by reading the tuples according to a random order generated on-the-fly by a Pseudo Random Number Generator [2] .
To achieve better write efficiency, IT processes the L iTuples in a random order in blocks of size n. While IT is processing a block, it stores the join results in its memory. IT writes all stored results to 'H after finishing processing one block. It repeats the process until completing all blocks. IT then obliviously filters out the decoys and outputs the real results.
If the number of join results K generated for a block is no more than the memory size, i.e., K <= M, then IT simply writes out M oTuples with M -K decoys. In this case, IT can achieve a write efficiency of M/n, which is better than that of Algorithm A2.
However, in the case where K > M, IT will not able to output all the join results in one pass and will need to access this block again to output the missing results. These "salvage" actions may lead to information leakage and compromise the privacy preserving property of the join process. We refer to this situation as a blemish case. It is certainly a design goal to minimize the probability of such a blemish case. Let x (n) be a random variable denoting the number of join results in n randomly selected iTuples. The probability of x(n) < M is the same as the probability of having at most M balls of a certain color out of n balls, which are selected from L balls in a non-replacement fashion. By a simple counting argument, this probability is given by
The probability for a blemish case to happen. Let 1-£ be a privacy preserving parameter where E C [0,11 can be chosen to be arbitrarily small. The optimal block size, denoted by n*, is the minimum n that satisfies PM(n) < E. n* can be found by solving the following problem:
The significance of n* is that, if IT processes iTuples by this optimal block size n*, then a blemish case will happen with probability at most E.
Following the above analysis, we propose Algorithm A3 with a privacy preserving guarantee of probability 1-E where EE We compare levels of privacy preserving and communication costs of Algorithms Al, A2, and A3 in Table I . 
